Africa and international humanitarian law: The more things change, the more they stay the same by Waschefort, G
This contribution has been submitted to the ICRC Review, and is currently under peer review. As such please do 
not distribute the document.  
1 
 
Africa and the Law of Armed Conflict: The more things change, the more they stay the 
same  
  
Gus Waschefort 
Gus Waschefort is an Associate Professor of International Law at the University of South 
Africa (waschca@unisa.ac.za).  
 
Abstract  
The law of armed conflict (LOAC) maintains a low profile on the African continent. On the 
one hand LOAC issues do not feature prominently in the armed conflict debate within Africa; 
and on the other, African states and people do not significantly participate in the global 
LOAC debate. These problems can be traced to the historical exclusion of Africa in the 
development of modern LOAC. There are essentially five groups who determine the agenda 
of the global debate: academics; governments; armed forces; civil society; and international 
organizations. Each of these groups provides an entry point to address the problems 
identified. 
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Introduction  
The First World War (WWI) was particularly significant in the context of the law of armed 
conflict or international humanitarian law (LOAC/IHL) in Africa. It marked the first occasion 
upon which African states engaged in armed conflict legally bound (in a material sense) by 
conventional international LOAC.1 African theatres of WWI were much more expansive 
territorially when compared to African theatres of World War II (WWII). Africans 
participated in WWI in three contexts: 1) colonial wars fought between local tribes and 
                                                          
1
 See the discussion of the application of LOAC during the Second Boer War below, as this 
example arguably provides a limited exception to the general statement that conventional 
LOAC first found application to African armed forces during WWI. 
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colonialist forces, such as the Zaian War in Morocco.2 2) Wars between opposing colonial 
powers within Africa, such as the East Africa Campaign (WWI) fought primarily between the 
British and German Empires in East Africa both of which utilized African forces extensively.3 
3) African soldiers deployed in European theatres of WWI subject to the command and 
control of officers from their colonial masters.4 It is impossible to know exactly how many 
Africans fought in European theatres of WWI. It has been estimated that the Allies mobilized 
650,000 colonial troops in Europe – however, this figure includes not only Africans.5 Britain 
did not mobilize any African troops in European theatres of war, but did do so in the Middle 
East. Yet according to Koller, “unlike Britain, the French deployed large numbers of African 
troops in Europe, including 172,800 soldiers from Algeria, 134,300 from West Africa, 60,000 
from Tunisia, 37,300 from Morocco, 34,400 from Madagascar and 2,100 from the Somali 
Coast”.6 The East Africa Campaign serves well to illustrate the level of African involvement, 
and African suffering during WWI. As Paice has stated:  
 
The death toll among the 126,972 British troops who served in the East 
Africa campaign was officially recorded as 11,189 – a mortality rate of nine 
per cent – and total casualties, including the wounded and missing, were a 
little over 22,000. The loss of life among armed combatants was, however, 
only the tip of the iceberg… By the end of the war more than one million 
                                                          
2
 This armed conflict was fought from 1914 to 1921 between France and the French 
Protectorate of Morocco on the one hand, and the Zaian Confederation (together with various 
Berber tribes) on the other. During WW1 the Zaian Confederation received support from the 
Central Powers.   
3
 The East Africa Campaign lasted from August 1914 to November 1918. African forces from 
across the British Empire was mobilized; German forces also relied heavily on local 
conscripts.  
4
 Christian Koller, “The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their 
Deployment in Europe during the First World War”, Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 26, Nos. 
1/2, March/July 2008, pp. 111–133. 
5
 Ibid, p. 113.  
6
 Ibid, p. 114. 
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[African] carriers had been recruited by the British in their colonies and in 
German East Africa, of whom no fewer than 95,000 had died…7 
 
The African armed forces that fought under colonial masters were bound to conventional 
LOAC not by virtue of the status of the ‘states’ to which they belonged being fully sovereign, 
as indeed most of them were not. Instead, they were bound by virtue of the fact that they acted 
as functionaries of their ‘colonial masters’ – most of whom were parties to antecedent LOAC 
conventions. More than a century has now passed since the beginning of WWI and it is 
unfortunate and unjust that Africans have still not been properly recognized for their 
contribution and sacrifice during the ‘Great War’. Even more unfortunate is the fact that 
during this past century LOAC has failed to come into its own in the most conflict-ridden 
continent post-WWII.8  
 
The landscape of international law has changed dramatically since the 28th of June 1914 when 
Gavrilo Princip fired those fateful shots – from a system of western hegemony and colonial 
domination to an all-inclusive international framework of sovereignly equal states.9 This 
massive structural metamorphosis of international law did not occur in a vacuum. We find 
that today Africa, both on the inter-state level and the academic level, maintains a very low 
profile in as far as the global debate on the LOAC goes. This is perhaps the principle reason 
why the most acute contemporary challenges to the LOAC in Africa do not feature 
prominently in this global debate. This lack of engagement with the LOAC, in turn, is very 
likely symptomatic of the exclusion of African states in the formative years of modern 
conventional LOAC. As such, this contribution is moulded around two related ideas: ‘the 
                                                          
7
 Edward Paice, Tip & Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London, 2007, pp. 392-393.  
8
 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst Violence is Ignored, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2008. Hawkins analysed conflict death tolls between 1990 and 2007 by calculating 
the land area of continents or regions in proportion to conflict. His calculation revealed that 
88% of deaths were in Africa, 8% in Asia, 2% in Europe, and 1% each in the Americas and 
the Middle East. The statistics for the period since 2007 are roughly the same. 
9
 Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on this date. It is widely agreed 
that this assassination was a linchpin that soon resulted in WWI.  
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marginalization of Africa in the global LOAC debate’ and ‘the marginalization of LOAC in 
the armed conflict debate within Africa’.  
 
The first part of this contribution, ‘Africa and the Development of the Law of Armed 
Conflict: From the 1864 Geneva Convention to the 1977 Protocols’, consists of a discussion 
of the status of African states during the colonial period and as such, their exclusion, for the 
most part, from international negotiations regarding LOAC. The Second Boer War, which 
predates WWI, is also discussed as the first African conflict where the Laws and Customs of 
War (as opposed to conventional LOAC) were applied as a matter of law.10 This discussion 
informs our understanding of why the Laws and Customs of War had not featured in Africa 
prior to the Second Boer War. This first part of the contribution serves to provide context to 
the second part of the contribution, ‘Africa in the Global LOAC Debate; and the LOAC 
Debate in Africa’. Here the dual contention that LOAC is not included in the armed conflict 
debate within Africa, and that LOAC challenges of particular concern and relevance within 
Africa are not included in the global LOAC discourse is considered. In particular, the role 
players that determine the agenda of the global debate are identified; and the extreme focus on 
pan-Africanism in regional integration within Africa is discussed as a stumbling block to the 
mainstreaming of more global regimes of law such as LOAC. Finally, the last part of the 
contribution touches on ‘The Future of LOAC in Africa’. In this part the role of the ICRC is 
highlighted in the mainstreaming process of LOAC within Africa.  
 
Many of the arguments put forward in this contribution hold true also for other parts of the 
developing world, notably South America and much of Asia. However, the present 
contribution is written from an African perspective, with reference to African considerations.  
 
                                                          
10
 The Boer Wars were two separate armed conflicts, the First Boer War was fought between 
the United Kingdom and the South African Republic from 20 December 1880 – 23 March 
1881. The Second Boer War, which was a much more significant armed conflict, both in 
intensity and duration, was fought between the British Empire on the one hand and the Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal – known as the South African Republic) and the Oranje-
Vrijstaat (Orange Free State) on the other hand, and lasted from 11 October 1899 to 31 May 
1902.  
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Africa and the Development of the Law of Armed Conflict: From the 1864 Geneva 
Convention to the 1977 Protocols   
Today much attention is placed on the rapid expansion and diversification of international 
law, which has led to different sub-sets of international law competing for dominance with 
one another. International lawyers generally have a grasp of the historical development of 
modern international law during the era of empire – which was characterized by western 
hegemony, exclusionism and exceptionalism. In contrast to this narrative of the development 
of general international law, the parallel development of the law of armed conflict, as a sub-
regime of international law, is generally portrayed as an all-inclusive, universal regime of law. 
For instance, in the introductory chapter of ‘The Handbook of International Humanitarian 
Law’ Greenwood paints the picture of such an all-inclusive regime that reflects practices from 
across the globe, and concludes “the theory that humanitarian law is essentially ‘Eurocentric’ 
is in reality more a criticism of most literature on the subject than a reflection of historical 
fact”.11 There thus seems to be a clear disconnect between ‘our’ understanding of the 
antecedent state of international law during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and ‘our’ 
understanding of the development of modern conventional LOAC, which occurred during the 
same period.  
 
                                                          
11
 Sir Christopher J. Greenwood “Historical Development and Legal Basis”, in Dieter Fleck 
(ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008, 2nd Edition, p. 16. Upon taking over authorship of this chapter for the 3rd edition of the 
publication, O’Connell retained this sentence, Mary Ellen O’Connell “Historical 
Development and Legal Basis”, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 3rd Edition, p. 16.  It is true that 
archeologically and anthropologically there is evidence of customary practice from within 
Africa and elsewhere that corresponds broadly to some principles both of modern law jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. However, no study has been undertaken to determine the degree and 
specificity of overlap. Moreover, the mere existence of such past practices in no way 
establishes a causal relationship between these practices and modern conventional LOAC. In 
fact, the factors that influenced the development of international law during the elaboration of 
early modern conventional LOAC very much suggests that there is no such causal 
relationship. 
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Modern conventional LOAC largely found its genesis in the first Geneva Convention of 1864 
and the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. In their elaboration, prevailing considerations 
that moulded general international law at the time surely also influenced them.12 In order to 
appreciate the context of the development of LOAC in Africa, it is imperative to address the 
status of African states within the international legal order during the period contemporary 
with key developments of such conventional LOAC.  
 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries European empires managed to absorb into their 
domain of power virtually the entire territory of Africa. The only states on the continent that 
arguably escaped western colonialism are Ethiopia and Liberia, and they are tenuous 
examples at best.13 While significant administrative colonial rule was never established in 
Liberia and Ethiopia, these states certainly did not escape the wrath of colonialism or alien 
domination all together. The practice of claiming territory in Africa predated the development 
of doctrine to justify such claims to territory. Most of the early modern informal colonial 
claims in Africa were based on colonial treaties.14 These treaties were essentially written 
                                                          
12
 Simma has warned that the effects of such expansion and diversification should not be 
overstated, and different sub-regimes of international law, including the modern LOAC, 
developed and continues to exist very much within the structural confines of international law 
more generally. Bruno Simma, “Fragmentation in a Positive Light”, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 25, 2004, pp. 846-847. 
13
 Between 1921 and 1947 the American Colonization Society formed a settlement of freed 
American slaves of African descent in Liberia (although in reality more settlers’ roots traced 
to Central America than Africa). This settlement was conceived of within the rhetoric of 
colonialism. During 1947 Liberia declared independence as Africa’s first republic. However, 
for the period 1947 until 1980 the so-called Americo-Liberians, who represented a significant 
minority in Liberia, absolutely dominated political power in that country. For its part, 
Ethiopia lost the Second Italo-Ethiopian War culminating in Italy’s military occupation of 
Ethiopia under the flag of Italian East Africa. Italian East Africa was short-lived, as in 1940 
Italy aligned itself with the Axis Powers and by the end of 1941 the Allied Powers liberated 
Ethiopia during the East Africa Campaign. 
14
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870 – 1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp.136-137. 
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documents signed and entered into by illiterate (in the western sense) village chiefs, in a 
language they did not understand, transferring all people within their village and their 
ancestor’s claims to the territory and its resources to the colonizing entity. It was on this basis 
that King Leopold II of Belgium infamously claimed the territory of modern day Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) as his own.15 The legendary explorer Stanley was the primary 
agent through which Leopold secured these treaties in the context of the Congo Free State. Sir 
Richard Francis Burton’s claim that "Stanley shoots negroes as if they were monkeys" goes 
some way in indicating that Belgian forces in the DRC considered themselves to operate in a 
legal and moral vacuum.16  
 
The concept of empire as it manifested in Africa was much more nuanced than the term 
‘colonialism’ suggests. Koskenniemi argues that there were various methods and mechanisms 
through which western powers could extend their exclusive influence in African states, which 
did not amount to formal administration and thus the establishment of a colony.17 Lord 
Lindley provides the example of British Bechuanaland: “an interesting example of a 
protectorate in which the internal as well as the external sovereignty has passed to the 
protecting Power, but the territory has not been formally annexed, so that, in the eyes if 
British law, it is not British territory”.18 One effect hereof was that British law did not apply 
within the relevant territory. As a result, Britain was able to maintain a de facto colony, 
without being hampered by British law, which for example outlawed slavery.   
 
Over time, doctrine developed to justify legally the colonization of non-western peoples. 
Essentially the justification for establishing colonial administrations, and acquiring territory 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, pp. 155-166.  
16
 See generally, Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and 
Heroism in Colonial Africa, Pan Books, London, 2006. See also generally, John 
Bierman, Dark Safari: The Life behind the Legend of Henry Morton Stanley, Hodder and 
Stoughton, London, 1991. 
17
 M. Koskenniemi, above note 14, pp. 124-125.  
18
 Lord M.F. Lindley, The acquisition and government of backward territory in international 
law: Being a treatise on the law and practice relating to colonial expansion, Longmans, 
Green And Co, London, 1926, p. 187.  
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through the means of occupation was founded on the notion that the relevant territory was 
terra nullius. That is to say that the territory was occupied by ‘savages’ who were not 
politically organized.19 The inherent hegemony of this construct is well illustrated by Lord 
Lindley’s writings on “backward territory” in international law of 1926 where he stated that 
“territory which is territorium nullius may pass under the dominion of a Sovereign” by 
occupation and accretion. He went on to state that on the other hand, “transference of territory 
under a Sovereign to the territorium nullius may take place” by abandonment, forfeiture and 
destruction.20 It is interesting to note the transacting parties are the Sovereign and the 
territorium nullius, no mention is made of the people indigenous to the territorium nullius.  
 
Koskenniemi speaks of ‘the myth of civilization: a logic of exclusion-inclusion’ when 
addressing the development of international law in the period contemporary with the first 
Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Regulations.21 The concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty, and the concomitant international legal personality that attaches to states proper 
was to undergo dramatic metamorphosis leading up to and following the Geneva Convention 
of 1864. However, this metamorphosis was gradual. Not only African states were 
marginalized during the early development of conventional LOAC. It was only in 1856 with 
the adoption of the Peace Treaty of Paris that a non-Christian state, Turkey, was regarded as a 
member of the international community of civilized states. This accounts for the fact that only 
twelve western European states negotiated the Geneva Convention of 1864. Only three 
African states ratified this Convention.22  
 
During 1899 Russia, as convener of the first Hague Conference invited twenty-six states to 
participate. In addition to the European states, the Islamic Republic of Iran, China, Japan, 
Siam, Turkey and the United States (US) were invited. By 1907, when the US took the 
                                                          
19
 During the 19th and early 20th centuries there was a nuanced debate regarding the regulation 
by international law of European engagement with the non-European world. The 
particularities of this debate go above and beyond the scope of this contribution.  
20
 Lord M.F. Lindley, above note 18 above, p. 187.  
21
 M. Koskenniemi, above note 14, pp. 127. 
22
 Congo (17 December 1888); Orange Free State (28 September 1897); and the South 
African Republic (30 September 1896). 
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initiative to organize the second Hague Conference, forty-seven states were invited, of which 
only Ethiopia, Costa Rica and Honduras did not attend. On this occasion those invited 
included a significant number of Central and South American states. Ethiopia was the only 
African invitee. These events were significant, but, at the time, they were still met with 
considerable scepticism. For his part, Westlake concluded that even though China, Siam and 
Persia participated in the Hague Conferences, their admission into the “system” nevertheless 
fell short of “recognizing the voices as of equal importance with those of the European and 
American Power”.23 To date, from the African Continent, only Ethiopia (during 1935), 
Liberia (during 1914) and South Africa (during 1978) have ratified any of the Hague 
Conventions/Declarations emanating from the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.  
 
By the time the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were negotiated, fifty-nine states participated. 
Thus, during the period between the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state during 1856, 
and the negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, membership to the international 
community of civilized states expanded significantly. As a corollary, so too did the number of 
states which actively engaged in the development of conventional LOAC. Nevertheless, from 
an African perspective not much had changed. Only Egypt and Ethiopia represented the 
African continent at the negotiations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.24  
 
A wave of decolonization followed the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and by 
the time the conference was convened to elaborate the 1977 Additional Protocols, 135 states 
participated, with thirty-nine states representing the African continent.25 Moreover, of the 
twelve National Liberation Movements from eight countries who attended as delegates, eight 
groups from six countries were African.26  
                                                          
23
 John Westlake, “The Native State of India”, (1910), in L. Oppenheim (ed.), The Collected 
Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014, p. 623.  
24
 “Final Record of Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949”, Vol I, 1949, pp. 158-170. 
25
 “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts Geneva”, Vol II (1974-1977), 
1977, pp. 25-408.  
26
 Ibid. 
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The importance in understanding the aforementioned history, for purposes of this 
contribution, lies in the implication that African states played no meaningful role in the 
negotiations and development of early LOAC instruments. Even more importantly, neither 
did they benefit from the protection of such instruments. We thus find that foundational 
notions of LOAC, such as equality of belligerents, were forged along the lines of who 
‘civilized’ states deemed to be their equals. In as far as the elaboration of treaty norms is 
concerned, LOAC is a rather stagnant branch of international law. As such, even though 
African states now form a part of the international community of sovereign equal states, the 
era of the development of foundational, conventional LOAC has largely passed. As will be 
further explored below, it should hardly be surprising that there is a rejection from among 
many quarters within Africa of legal concepts, the development of which occurred in a 
manner where African states were intentionally and consciously excluded from participation.  
 
The Second Boer War and the Application of ‘the Laws and Customs of War’: A First for 
Africa?   
While it is true that it was only during WWI that African states engaged in armed conflict 
subject to conventional LOAC, it is worth mentioning that there is much evidence that 
indicates that during the Second Boer War both the British and Boer forces constrained their 
actions in combat due to what they considered their respective legal obligations. The question 
arises as to what the source of these legal obligations was. The point of departure of Western 
Powers in the colonial wars was generally that the communities indigenous to the territory in 
question never had any form of sovereignty to begin with. Sovereignty, as it were, was a 
concept reserved exclusively for European powers. Westlake argued: “International law has to 
treat natives as uncivilized. It regulates, for the mutual benefit of the civilized states, the 
claims they make to sovereignty over the region and leaves the treatment of the natives to the 
conscience of the state to which sovereignty is awarded.”27 This point of departure was 
challenged during the Second Boer War, as the Boers too were of European decent. Yet, there 
was a voice that maintained the general premise regarding colonial territories and their 
                                                          
27
 J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, (1894), in L. Oppenheim 
above note 23, p. 143, as quoted in M. Koskenniemi, above note 14, p. 127. 
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peoples in the context of the Second Boer War. Field Marshal Lord Wolsely, Commander-in-
Chief, British War Office, expressed the view: 
 
I know the Boers of all classes to be most untruthful in all their dealings with 
us and even amongst themselves. They are very cunning, a characteristic 
common to all untruthful races… To attempt to tie our hands in any way, no 
matter how small, by the ‘Laws and Customs of War’ proposed for Civilized 
nations at the Peace Conference, would be in my opinion suicidal, for the 
Boers would not be bound by any such amenities.28   
 
This perspective certainly represented the minority view at the time. The source of legal 
obligations to which both the British and Boer forces subjected themselves, in as far as LOAC 
is concerned, is either the Laws and Customs of War, or conventional LOAC. The only 
LOAC convention to which all forces involved were party was the 1864 Geneva Convention. 
Nevertheless, Major-General Sir John Ardagh, Director, British Military Intelligence, was of 
the view that the substantive content of the Hague Conventions embodied the Laws and 
Customs of War, and as such found general application.29 Ardagh further commented:  
 
The peculiar conditions of the war in South Africa may justify a departure in 
certain instances from the Laws and Customs of War on the ground of 
military necessity, but as reciprocity is the foundation of the observance of 
international rules, it should be most carefully weighed how such departures 
would affect us if their exercise was appealed to as precedent created by 
ourselves when we found ourselves engaged in other wars.30 
 
                                                          
28
 Lord Wolseley to Parliamentary Under-Secretary, War Office 32/850, 14 February 1900, as 
quoted in Andries W.G. Raath and Hennie A. Strydom, “The Hague Conventions and the 
Anglo-Boer War” South African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24, 1999, p. 156.  
29
 Major-General Sir John Ardagh, “Ardagh Papers”, Microfilm A422, Transvaal Archives, 
Pretoria.  
30
 Major-General Sir John Ardagh, “Ardagh Papers”, National Archives of the United 
Kingdom, PRO 30/40/17.  
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It is not uncommon for national armed forces to constrain their actions during battle to 
specific sets of rules or norms not due to legal obligation per se, but as a result of a policy 
decision to that effect. We see this often in the modern context with respect to European 
States who seek to ensure that their operations, in specific contexts, are consistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, even where this Convention does not find 
application as a matter of law.31 The contextual basis for understanding the legal status of the 
Boer forces during the war is to be found in the 1903 judgment by Innes, CJ in the matter Van 
Deventer v Hancke and Mossop.32  
 
This case related to a claim for property that was confiscated by British forces during the war. 
However, the status of various forces at various points in time during and after the war was 
central to settling the questions of law that lay at the heart of the matter. The case was heard 
in Pretoria following British victory, and the annexation of the two Boer Republics. As such, 
the Court was convened as a Court of the Crown. Innes, CJ held:  
 
… from the point of view of a British Court, [the Burgher forces] were a 
community or body of men possessing no territory as a State and under no 
form of government which such a Court could recognize as a legal 
government. But, as between the two contending armies they enjoyed full 
                                                          
31
 The European Court of Human Rights has rendered a series of judgements on the 
extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically in the 
context of armed conflict. This growing jurisprudence has been marred by inconsistencies and 
incoherencies, leading states with a large degree of uncertainty regarding precisely under what 
circumstances the European Convention on Human Rights will find application to military 
operations extraterritorially. This confusion has been furthered by the recent judgement in 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment, Grand 
Chamber, 2014, 29750/09, where the Court failed to give clarity on the co-application of 
International Human Rights Law and LOAC. It is very likely that this general uncertainty 
impacts upon states’ decision to apply the European Convention on Human Rights to military 
operations as a policy, so as to err on the side of caution.   
32
 Supreme Court of Transvaal, Van Deventer v. Hancke and Mossop, 1903, TS 401.  
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belligerent rights. The recognition of such rights is quite consistent with a 
denial of any claim to sovereignty…33  
 
To support its finding in this regard, the Court referred to the US Supreme Court judgment in 
Rose v. Himely where the same reasoning was employed as regards a war between France and 
its former colony St. Domingo.34 Thus, a British Court had determined that, as a matter of 
law, the Burgher forces “enjoyed full belligerent rights”, and as such, as a matter of law, the 
Laws and Customs of War applied during the Second Boer War. A further interesting 
observation in this regard is that the past practice of recognition of belligerency did provide 
for a form of Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) long before the elaboration of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. Nevertheless, the 
recognition of belligerency was a subjective determination that falls short of modern LOAC 
standards. It is also telling that the Treaty of Vereeniging that ended the Second Boer War, 
recognized a form of combatants’ privilege:  
 
No proceedings CIVIL or CRIMINAL will be taken against any of the 
BURGHERS so surrendering or so returning for any Acts in connection 
with the prosecution of the War. The benefit of this clause will not extend to 
certain Acts contrary to the usage of War which have been notified by the 
Commander in Chief to the Boer Generals, and which shall be tried by 
Court Martial immediately after the close of hostilities.35 
 
Dugard is of the view that even though there are doubts about the independence of the South 
African Republic, the Second Boer War (1899-1902) was regarded by all states as a war 
between sovereign independent states – including the United Kingdom.36 It is important to 
mention that at the time of the commencement of the Second Boer War, the United Kingdom 
as well as Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal) and the Oranje-Vrijstaat (Free State) had 
                                                          
33
 Ibid, pp. 412-413.  
34
 Supreme Court of the United States, Rose v Himely, 8 U.S. 4 Cranch 241 (1808). 
35
 Treaty of Vereeniging, 31 May 1902, (entered into force on 31 May 1902), Art. 4. 
36
 John Dugard, Principles of International Law: A South African Perspective, Juta, Cape 
Town, 2011, 4th Edition, p. 16. 
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all ratified the Geneva Convention of 1864.37 Nevertheless, this convention is one of 
extremely limited scope, dealing exclusively with medical assistance to wounded and sick 
soldiers. Additionally, no appeal was ever made to the application of any of the ten articles 
that make up this convention during the Second Boer War. As such, conventional LOAC did 
not find real application during the Second Boer War. 
 
The question arises why this same reasoning, being the basis on which the Laws and Customs 
of War was applicable to relevant military engagement, was not employed in other wars 
between colonizing powers and local populations. Many factors certainly impacted on this, 
the most important of which seems to be that what lay at the heart of the distinction was 
conceptions of being civilized and being savage. The forces of both the Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek (Transvaal) and the Oranje-Vrijstaat (Free State), the two Boer Republics who 
fought the Second Boer War, were of western European descent; they spoke a European 
language (Dutch); they dressed like Europeans; they were Christian; and they organized 
themselves politically in a European manner. It was thus more difficult to employ the rhetoric 
of civilized versus savage in interaction with the Boer forces. No legal criteria were ever 
developed to determine which peoples were savages and which were civilized – these 
determinations were based on social constructs and not legal criteria.  
 
Africa in the Global LOAC Debate; and the LOAC Debate in Africa  
Speaking of a global debate is in many respects not satisfactory, as there are many on-going 
debates on LOAC issues at any given time, some global and some more local. These debates 
are dynamic and take on new dimensions as they progress. Nevertheless, it is useful to be able 
to refer to those issues that feature prominently and consistently in the contemporary LOAC 
discourse collectively. For present purposes, the term ‘the global debate’ will be used.  
 
Whether it be technological innovation that creates new means of armed conflict, or whether 
it be challenges to fundamental notions of the law of armed conflict posed by new methods, 
the global discourse on the law of armed conflict is directed – for the most part – by ‘the 
cutting edge’ as determined by the needs of a select few western states. Along these contours 
                                                          
37
 The Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek and the Oranje-Vrijstaat ratified the Convention on 30 
September 1896 and 28 September 1897, respectively.  
This contribution has been submitted to the ICRC Review, and is currently under peer review. As such please do 
not distribute the document.  
15 
 
we see massive bodies of work develop on topics such as cyber warfare and terrorism, among 
many others. Indeed, the technology that drives new means of armed conflict is so dynamic 
that in a consumerist style the debate keeps shifting from one technology to the next. This 
drive to focus on the cutting-edge largely ignores marginalized conflicts in developing 
countries, particularly non-international armed conflicts, and this focus on the new is, in my 
view wrongly, premised, in part, on the assumption that we have largely exhausted debate on 
the old.  
 
As was alluded to in the introduction, the LOAC maintains a very low profile on the African 
continent. There are two sides to this coin – on the one side LOAC issues do not feature 
prominently in the armed conflict debate within Africa (certainly not when compared to the 
developed/western world). On the flipside, African states and African people do not 
participate, in a significant manner, in the global debate. These two facets of the problem 
cannot be divorced from one another. The only way in which African states and role players 
can influence the agenda of the global debate is by including LOAC issues in the armed 
conflict debate within Africa, and so progressively infiltrate the global debate.  
 
Determining the Agenda of the Contemporary Global LOAC Debate  
Before determining which issues feature in this debate, and equally important which issues do 
not feature, it is relevant to consider who the parties are who set the agenda for this global 
debate. There are essentially five groups of actors who have the potential, in any given case, 
to influence the agenda of the global debate: academics; governments; armed forces; civil 
society; and international organizations (including regional organizations).38 States remain the 
primary agents through which international law, including LOAC, is developed. Among these 
five groups, states are represented both by the group “governments” as well as the group 
“armed forces”. This is so because in the context of LOAC armed forces often play a very 
central role in determining a state’s policy in respect of LOAC issues. Each of these entities 
pursue unique goals and agendas. However, the goals and agendas of governments, armed 
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forces and international organizations (as state-based organizations) will often be loosely 
aligned. Engagement with specific IHL issues by these role players is determined by what is 
relevant to them and their agendas at any given point in time. They all engage with one 
another, and they also engage with their networks beyond their states. The agendas of many 
of these role players take on an added layer of political complexity in the context of peace 
support and multi-national operations. Of these groups of actors it is only academics which 
have the freedom to pursue research agendas that are not related to current events or 
developments. However, academically there is generally less value in pursuing a research 
agenda divorced from the pertinent legal questions of the time. I am not suggesting that role 
players belonging to each of these five categories absolutely have to engage with an issue for 
that issue to make it onto the agenda – indeed, this is usually not the case. Often, military and 
government lawyers will be very tight-lipped about specific LOAC issues. For instance, when 
it became public knowledge that the US is using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the 
context of its targeted killing programmes, the issue of the use of weaponised UAVs 
skyrocketed to the top of the agenda of the global LOAC debate. Those responsible for this 
were for the most part academics, civil society and functionaries within international 
organizations. Nevertheless, it is supremely important to note that while the US government 
and US armed forces, for obvious reasons, often avoid pertinent issues, when they do engage 
with matters such as UAVs they do so within the language and structural parameters of 
LOAC (that is not to say that their positions are necessarily in conformity with LOAC).39   
 
While not an exhaustive list, most will agree that the following issues have featured 
prominently in the global debate during the past decade: automated weapons such as UAVs; 
issues related to the scope of regulation of NIAC; cyber warfare; detention issues; non-state 
armed actors (both in the context of IAC and NIAC); the so-called War on Terror; peace 
support operations; and the notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH). Very 
importantly, I am not arguing that these issues are irrelevant to African states – instead I am 
arguing that these issues are not necessarily the primary issues of concern in the context of 
ongoing armed conflicts in Africa. Moreover, where these are issues of such concern, they are 
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not discussed within the global debate from the African perspective. All of the issues listed 
above can be divided into two categories: new issues that came to the fore on the one hand, 
and more traditional issues that have regained significance on the other. New issues, for the 
most part, are technologically driven such as remote technologies and cyber warfare.40 These 
issues are not of equal significance to armed conflict in Africa when compared to armed 
conflicts in which the US and other developed countries have been party to in recent times. In 
the context of traditional issues the question is why do they regain significance?  
 
The number of armed conflicts at any given time will probably surprise most. The DRC, for 
example, have seen the parallel existence of multiple ongoing armed conflicts, of an 
international and non-international character, at the same time. It is, however, not surprising 
that from among this vast array of armed conflicts internationally it is only a handful that set 
the trends as far as the global debate on IHL is concerned. This is not due to any specific 
agenda of exclusion, or exceptionalism. Instead, when countries within which LOAC is 
prioritized (that is to say where there is a critical mass of LOAC expertise and focus from 
among a combination of role players belonging to the five categories mentioned above) 
engage in armed conflict, debate on issues that affect the specific armed conflict intensifies 
dramatically. Many of the issues that have become relevant in the context of western military 
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as detention during NIAC,41 have long existed in 
the context of many armed conflicts in states across Africa. However, because of a lack of 
engagement with IHL within these states, these issues were not elevated in any significant 
way, to the global level of discourse and debate.  
 
 “African solutions for African problems” and the Marginalization of LOAC in Africa42  
Again, while not being an exhaustive list, during the past two decades alone there has been 
armed conflict in: Cameroon; the Central African Republic; Chad; Côte d’Ivoire; Djibouti; the 
DRC; Egypt; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Liberia; Libya; Mali; Niger; Nigeria; Sierra Leone; Somalia; 
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South Sudan; Sudan; and Uganda. Some of these states, notably the DRC and Somalia, 
continue to suffer from armed conflict and have done so for multiple decades. The human cost 
of armed conflict on the African continent has been devastating. The death toll of the Second 
Congo War has been estimated, at the most liberal end of the spectrum at 5.4 million people, 
and at the most conservative end of the spectrum at 860 thousand people.43 Africa is indeed a 
continent of many problems. 
 
“African solutions for African problems” makes for an appealing sentiment, one of self-
reliance, responsibility and autonomy. However, this sentiment can also stand to exclude 
global solutions to African problems – such as LOAC. To borrow from Koskenniemi again, 
there is frequently “a logic of exclusion-inclusion” in the operationalization of “African 
solutions for African problems”. It is a convenient way to exclude external scrutiny. A key 
example in this regard is the position taken by many African states on the occasion of an 
extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African 
Union (AU) during October 2013 which was set up specifically to discuss the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecution of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President 
William Samoei Ruto, both of Kenya. In this regard Dersso has commented:  
 
Sadly, the heads of state and government who attended the summit defended 
their position to insulate themselves from ICC prosecution based on the 
political ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’. Hiding behind this 
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to serve their self-interest is both a misuse and a perversion of the ideal. Such 
instrumentalisation of this ideal erodes its moral force as well as its political 
and institutional significance for enabling the continent to take the lead in 
dealing with the challenges it faces.44  
 
There is certainly a large measure of truth to the critique that much of our international 
architecture is dominated by western thought. The solution however lies not in withdrawing 
into the regional shell under the banner of “African solutions for African problems”. A further 
implication of this is that African states are not bringing to the table African solutions to 
global problems. As Sen has opined:  
 
I have also argued against considering the question of impartiality in the 
fragmented terms that apply only within nation states – never stepping beyond 
the borders. This is important not only for being as inclusive in our thinking 
about justice in the world as possible, but also to avoid the dangers of local 
parochialism against which Adam Smith warned nearly two and a half 
centuries ago. Indeed, the contemporary world offers much greater 
opportunity of learning from each other, and it seems a pity to try to confine 
the theorization of justice to the artificially imposed limits of nation states. 
This is not only because … "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere" (though that is hugely important as well).  But in addition we 
have to be aware how our interest in other people across the world has been 
growing, along with our growing contacts and increasing communication.45 
 
Much attention has been placed of late on creating buy-in among armed non-state actors into 
LOAC principles, with the underlying idea being that voluntary compliance will be enhanced 
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should there be such buy-in by the armed actor in question.46 This approach has been 
operationalized specifically in Africa and other parts of the developing world.47 At the same 
time, it is overlooked that in the African context, there is often little buy-in into the LOAC 
even from state actors. The historical discussion with which this contribution commenced 
serves to contextualize the present-day lack of engagement with LOAC within Africa.  
 
As armed conflict issues are not discussed within the parameters of LOAC in Africa, the 
question arises in which areas other than LOAC are these issues absorbed? The rhetoric 
within Africa is largely one of pan-Africanism and regional integration. The preamble to the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union commences with these words: “Inspired by the noble 
ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of 
Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation 
among the peoples of Africa and African States”. Additionally, the stated goals of the African 
Union, as provided for in the Constitutive Act, include:  
 
(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa; […] 
(c) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
(d) promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the 
continent and its peoples; […]  
(j) promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural 
levels as well as the integration of African economies; […] 
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(l) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future 
Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives 
of the Union.48 
 
There is little doubt that this embrace of pan-Africanism and regional integration in Africa is 
a response to historical western domination and subjugation.49 As a result, collectively, 
African states have selectively embraced regimes of law that fit into the goals of pan-
Africanism and regional integration. International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for example, is 
very well suited to these goals. Through the application of developed IHRL concepts, such as 
the principle of subsidiarity, the operationalization of legal norms can occur mostly in a more 
local space – the African continent. Despite being the least developed of the three regional 
human rights systems, the African system has received a great deal of attention. Africa has 
produced leading human rights law scholars whose voices are heard, and taken seriously, on 
the international stage. Many African universities play host to academic centres and research 
focus groups on IHRL. Across Africa there are innumerable African grass roots human rights 
NGOs that act as a check on state power. For the most part debate regarding LOAC issues are 
either absorbed or muffled by the vibrant IHRL debate, and within the architecture of human 
rights law, on the continent. This has further been facilitated by the recent emphasis on the co-
application of LOAC and IHRL, as a result of the fact that such co-application emphasizes the 
relevance of IHRL to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities and the protection of victims 
of war. This is not to say that such co-application is undesirable, but rather that, by definition, 
IHRL cannot cater for all aspects of the regulation of the conduct of hostilities and the 
protection of victims of war. There thus seems to be an attempt to fit a square peg in a round 
hole. 
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Viljoen has argued that Africa has indeed played a major role in developing LOAC.50 The 
title of Viljoen’s contribution is “Africa’s contribution to the development of international 
human rights and humanitarian law” – he thus addressed both IHRL as well as LOAC 
together. The examples Viljoen cites of Africa’s contribution to the development of human 
rights are plentiful, and include: unique facets of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights;51 developments regarding children’s rights initiated by the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child;52 developments regarding refugee protection initiated by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa;53 environmental protection with specific reference to developments 
brought on by the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
and the Bamako Convention.54 In addition to these developments which emanated from 
within Africa, Viljoen also indicates that African states played a meaningful role in the 
development of the UN human rights architecture.55 The argument that Africa engages 
actively with the development of human rights, both regionally and internationally, is very 
compelling. In contrast hereto, the examples drawn upon to indicate Africa’s contribution to 
LOAC are limited to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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(ICTR) and its jurisprudence; the adoption of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the 
ICC;56 and the regulation of mercenaries.57 These examples are not nearly as compelling as 
those he cited in respect of human rights. Firstly, the ICTR was created through a Security 
Council Resolution,58 only three African states voted on the resolution, of which one voted 
against – being the only vote against; secondly, both the ICTR and ICC belong more properly 
to international criminal law and not LOAC;59 and finally, the regulation of mercenaries is 
indeed an area of LOAC in which Africa played a leading role. However, citing Taulbee,60 
Viljoen acknowledges:  
 
The African response can be explained primarily with reference to the fact 
that the mercenary has become ‘the symbol of racism and neo-colonialism 
within the Afro-Asian bloc’, because the recurring scenario was one of ‘white 
soldiers of fortune fighting black natives’.61  
 
Thus it seems that African states’ motivation for engaging with this issue is directly linked to 
their lack of motivation in engaging with LOAC more generally, being the colonial history. 
Viljoen’s contribution further serves as a good example of the point made above, that in the 
African context the LOAC debate is, for the most part, absorbed into IHRL. This is not a 
criticism of Viljoen, who specifically acknowledges that “international humanitarian law is 
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distinct from international human rights law”.62 Indeed there are many virtues in the co-
application of IHRL and LOAC, and in multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinary scholarship more 
generally. However, in an environment where LOAC issues are dealt with mostly by human 
rights lawyers, often these issues are subjugated to human rights thinking and ideals which is 
not always consistent with the ideals of LOAC, and, there is the further implication that these 
issues are not dealt with by subject-matter experts.  
 
The preceding discussion serves largely as an indictment of African role players for failing to 
come to the LOAC table and make their voices heard. This is, however, not the entire picture. 
First, as the initial part of this contribution suggests, the colonial history impacted heavily on 
creating a climate of scepticism of international, largely western, concepts such as the LOAC 
from among African states. Secondly, a seat is generally not reserved for African role players 
at the LOAC table on the international level. For example, only one expert from Africa 
participated in the process that led to the adoption of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (DPH 
Study).63 It is worth mentioning that with the prevalence of NIACs within Africa, the notion 
of DPH is of incredible significance to the African continent. Another example is the Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual).64 The 
Tallinn Manual process was an expert-driven process, initiated by the NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, an accredited NATO ‘Centre of Excellence’.65 This may 
suggest that the process included only participants from NATO member states. However, this 
is not the case. For instance, Colonel Penny Cumming (Australian Defence Force) 
participated as an expert. None of the experts, peer reviewers or editors involved in this 
process are African. It is true that at present cyber warfare is not a threat in Africa comparable 
to other parts of the world. Nevertheless, it certainly is one of the major global future threats 
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in which all states internationally have an interest. What is further interesting is the extent to 
which the experts involved in the DPH study and the Tallinn process overlap.66 This may well 
entrench a sentiment that exists in some quarters: that a small clique of western experts 
dominates these processes.  
 
From the preceding discussion there seems to be a disconnect between the attitude from 
within Africa regarding engagement with LOAC, that is to say a conscious lack of 
engagement with the global debate, and the attitude from those international role players who 
are well established within the LOAC debate regarding bringing Africa to the table. On the 
one hand, it appears that the colonial experience of western domination and subjugation has 
entrenched a sentiment within African states of distrust of more international and perhaps 
western concepts such as LOAC. At the same time, international role players certainly do not 
exclude African participants intentionally. Rather their experience is such that there is not a 
will from within African states to participate in these processes, and to develop the subject-
matter expertise necessary to engage with the LOAC debate on the global level. Clearly the 
solution to this problem requires active engagement from both sides of this divide.  
 
The Future of LOAC in Africa  
The means and methods of armed conflict in Africa have in no way remained stagnant during 
the century since the beginning of WWI, but developments in the African context are much 
less technologically driven. Some of the issues of specific concern in contemporary armed 
conflict in Africa include: the criminalized character of contemporary armed conflicts 
(including the scramble for natural resources); the effects of porous borders and mobile non 
state armed actors; issues regarding the application rationi loci of LOAC; the escalation and 
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de-escalation of violence in the context of small-scale NIACs and the application and 
cessation of application of LOAC; child soldiering; and linking violence to disorganized 
organized armed groups. Some of these issues have featured in the global debate, while others 
have not. The criminalized character of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa, and the 
associated exploitation of natural resources, as well as child soldiering are issues that have 
received very broad attention. One key example in this regard is the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme.67 At the same time other issues, such as the escalation and de-escalation 
of violence in the context of small-scale NIACs and the application and cessation of 
application of LOAC, do not feature in any significant manner in the global debate. Yet still 
other issues, such as non-state armed actors, that has long existed in the African context, do 
feature in the global debate, but this is largely due to this problem having occurred in much 
more recent history in the context of armed conflicts to which developed states are party.  
 
Why do some of these issues feature in the global debate, and others not? There are many 
factors that influence this, including: both resource exploitation and child soldiering were key 
issues in highly visible armed conflicts in Africa, such as the Sierra Leone and Liberian civil 
wars; both resource exploitation and child soldiering are issues of concern beyond LOAC – 
that is to say areas of law such as IHRL and environmental law also engage with these issues 
directly; in the context of resource exploitation the consumer market is often western (such as 
diamonds and columbite-tantalite). Nevertheless, even these issues of particular African 
concern that are discussed within the global debate do not feature much in the debate within 
Africa. Child soldiering, for example, is not exclusively an African problem, but it certainly 
has been a greater problem within Africa than elsewhere for many years. Yet, the civil society 
organizations, governments and academics that engage with this issue most vigorously are 
generally not African. 
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It is not possible to devise a concrete, pre-determined, action plan for the mainstreaming of 
LOAC within Africa, and Africa in the global LOAC debate. Achieving this goal will require 
a flexible and comprehensive approach. As mentioned before, the focus should be on 
enhancing the LOAC debate within Africa. Should this be achieved, the inclusion of African 
issues within the global debate will occur as a matter of course. As a start, it is most important 
to identify entry points, around which momentum can be built. Much of the preceding 
discussion has focused on Africa as a regional entity. However, this regional entity is made up 
of states, and states act in their own interest before acting in the regional interest. It is not 
feasible to have focused this contribution at individual state considerations, as this would 
involve 54 states that make up the African continent. However, it will not be realistic not to 
recognize the fact that the LOAC debate within each state is unique. Of the five role players 
identified before (academics; governments; armed forces; civil society; and international 
organizations) it is unlikely that the initiative will come from governments or the armed 
forces of any specific states. What is needed is an entity that has the potential to engage with 
each state in Africa, and specifically those states affected by armed conflict. Two such entities 
exist: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the AU. Ewumbue-Monono 
and Von Flüe identified the transition from the OAU to the AU as a watershed moment for 
ICRC engagement in promoting IHL within Africa.68 In reflecting on ICRC engagement with 
the OAU these authors recognized that:  
 
 
Although on balance OAU-ICRC cooperation in promoting humanitarian 
law has had some positive effects, these could be increased in cooperation 
with the African Union, which has wider objectives and has created new 
opportunities for promoting and implementing international humanitarian 
law in Africa.69 
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Unfortunately, after thirteen years, it appears that the level of engagement with LOAC within 
the AU has not progressed. It is thus unlikely that the AU would, of its own accord, intensify 
its engagement with LOAC. As such, it still falls to the ICRC to not only engage with states 
individually, but also to work with the AU in placing LOAC firmly on the agenda of the 
armed conflict debate within Africa.   
 
The ICRC has a delegation accredited to the African Union, and has thirty-three delegations 
in Africa in total. Moreover, the ICRC delegation to the African Union has had “observer 
status” first at the OAU and then the AU since 1992. The ICRC delegations in Africa are very 
active in LOAC training and dissemination. This is of incredible importance, as we know that 
the benefits of LOAC are not unlocked through enforcement, but through compliance. For 
compliance to occur within armed forces two essential ingredients are required: proper 
training and discipline. What more could then be done? Notwithstanding these efforts, it is 
clear that, for example, AU engagement with LOAC is not significant. While the ICRC is 
very involved in Africa, the organization does not involve Africa significantly in their affairs 
at Head Quarters level. This is well evidenced by the lack of involvement of African experts 
in substantive ICRC studies. This is certainly an area in which the ICRC can improve in 
respect of engagement with Africa.  
 
A further issue is that, as a Swiss organization, the ICRC also fits into the mould of 
‘Eurocentrism’ of which many African entities are particularly critical and sceptical. This 
problem can be mitigated in a number of ways. The ICRC can decentralize their engagement 
strategy with the AU by engaging more extensively with African civil society – that is to say 
not the global NGOs with a footprint in Africa, but instead the African initiated NGOs. These 
civil society organizations may in turn engage with the AU and member states. The ICRC can 
also make much greater use of local expertise in training and other areas of engagement. Let 
Africans be the mouthpiece to advocate LOAC ideals to Africans wherever feasible. These 
suggestions may appear to serve to manipulate states and role players in Africa, by 
“disguising” the work of the ICRC. However, this is not the case. Instead, the ICRCs 
understanding and manner of work will also develop through working closer with African 
role players.  
 
Conclusion  
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The need for greater African involvement in the LOAC debate was recognized by Bello when 
he proposed the establishment of an African Institute of International Humanitarian Law 
during 1984.70 There are people in Africa working within the five sectors that determine the 
global LOAC debate that work tirelessly at elevating LOAC within Africa, and Africa in the 
global LOAC debate. It is unfortunately a rather lonely endeavour. African states and role 
players have participated very strongly in the development of other areas of international law, 
with international criminal law as a key example due to its proximate existence with LOAC. 
Unlike the case with the LOAC, African states played a central role in developing 
international criminal law, not only in the context of treaty negotiations, but also 
jurisprudential development specifically in the context of the ICTR and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. The deterioration of the relationship between the ICC and African states is a 
very sad and unfortunate state of affairs. Nevertheless, African involvement, and certainly 
initial buy-in into the international criminal law project can serve as a beacon of hope, and 
perhaps a blue print for the mainstreaming of LOAC within Africa, and Africa in the global 
LOAC debate.    
 
There is a need for the development of academic expertise within Africa on LOAC. African 
scholars can play a very meaningful role in bringing issues of African concern to the attention 
of international audiences through conference presentations and scholarly publications. 
Unfortunately, yet predictably, in ‘our’ desire to be at the forefront of our field, African 
scholars tend to engage more with those issues that are on the global agenda than the issues of 
African concern that are not on this agenda. As an anecdotal example, I can draw on my own 
experience as a South African academic: I know many more postgraduate students pursuing 
research in LOAC within South Africa (but coming from the continent more generally) who 
are engaging with issues such as UAVs and cyber warfare than I know students who are 
engaging with issues of particular concern within Africa.  
 
In this contribution I have emphasised the role of the ICRC in facilitating the mainstreaming 
of LOAC in Africa. There are other entry points too. Each of the five role players identified as 
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primarily being responsible for determining the agenda of the global debate (academics; 
governments; armed forces; civil society; and international organizations) provides for 
multiple entry points in furthering the goal of mainstreaming LOAC in Africa, and Africa in 
the global debate. The value of this contribution lies much more in identifying the problem 
and the complexities that caused the problem, than providing the solution. This is because 
only once there is awareness of the problem can those individuals and entities who are in a 
position to be part of the solution direct their actions to mainstreaming LOAC in Africa.  
 
